In summary, it seems clear that Roussau`s social contract was an idea in advance, although it is not in a position to support the development of contracts operationally. Nevertheless, this publication was very early to highlight the reasons for the cooperation between the actors and to highlight the net benefits as a whole; Practitioners and contract researchers can hardly remain indifferent to this distinctive feature of the 18th century social contract. Rousseau died in 1778. His work continues to attract the interest of sociologists and develop new interpretations of the social contract, as in the theory of games.9 For all the glory of Rousseau, it is ironic that at the time of its publication, the social contract was banned in Geneva and France (for religious reasons, it must be admitted) and that Rousseau had to flee to escape arrest. One of the advantages of the non-reducing approach is that, in the context of the contractual procedure (I), elected officials share many of the normative concerns of their actual counterparts. This should ensure a closer normative link between the two parties and allow the treaty to create a thicker, more substantial morality, probably closer to that already held by I. Whether this is the case, however, depends on the extent to which the non-reductionist rationality model of real individual arguments is marginal. Since Locke did not imagine the state of nature as ferocious as Hobbes, he could imagine conditions under which it would be better to refuse a particular civil government and return to the state of nature, in order to establish a better civilian government in its place. It is therefore both the vision of human nature and the very nature of morality that constitute the differences between Hobbes` and Locke on the social contract. Models include abstraction and idealization, but they do more than that: they help us to see what are our main hypotheses, identifying the factors we consider relevant (Gaus 2016, xv-xvii). Michael Weisberg agrees that models as techniques of idealization are more than abstract (2007a, 2013). Consider the periodic table of items.
It`s an abstraction, but not a Weisberg model. He calls abstractions such as the periodic table of abstract direct representations to distinguish them from models (2007b). Modelling aims to isolate the important characteristics of target phenomena so that the modeler can understand and manipulate important elements of phenomena in simulations. John Rawls` representatives in the original position, for example, are not just abstractions of real people. These are idealizations that isolate certain aspects of people that are relevant to justification as a choice, especially their thin theory of rationality and their values (in the form of primary goods). The isolation of these functions is important for modeling the agreement procedure in Rawls theory. The main approach to the negotiation process stems from the influential work of Rubinstein (1982) and his evidence that it can be shown that, in some cases, a process of alternating supply negotiation will produce the same result as Nash`s axiomatic solution. This result gave life to Nash (1950) the early observation that negotiations and rules of negotiations must be the result of an uncooperative game, with the idea that it might be possible to unify negotiation theory and game theory. This approach, called the Nash program, is mainly supported by Binmore (1998), whose evolutionary approach to social contract is based on biological evolution (the game of life) to create the basic conditions of haggling (the game of morality). Both can be modeled as non-cooperative games and later can be modeled as a trading problem.